The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”: UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the Complexities of Migration in Southeast Asia by Nah, Alice M.
 
Revue européenne des migrations
internationales 
vol. 35 - n°1 et 2 | 2019
Asia Pacific Migration
The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”:
UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the
Complexities of Migration in Southeast Asia
L’autorité ambiguë d’un État subrogé : la négociation de l’asile par le HCR face à
la complexité des migrations en Asie du Sud-Est
La ambigua autoridad de un Estado de sustitución: la negociación del asilo por










Date of publication: 1 October 2019





Alice M. Nah, « The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”: UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the
Complexities of Migration in Southeast Asia », Revue européenne des migrations internationales [Online],
vol. 35 - n°1 et 2 | 2019, Online since 01 January 2021, connection on 04 January 2021. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/remi/12582  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.12582 
© Université de Poitiers
63
R EM i Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 63-86
The Ambiguous Authority 
of a “Surrogate State”: 
UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in 
the Complexities of Migration 
in Southeast Asia
Alice M. Nah1
In December 2018, a majority of the member states of the United Nations 
adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration as well 
as the Global Compact on Refugees, the latter proposed by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While the impact of these Global 
Compacts is yet uncertain, what is clear is that this dual-track approach has 
reinforced the distinction between “refugees” and “migrants” rather than 
problematizing it. In Southeast Asia, people who are displaced across borders 
are likely to be more affected by the Global Compact on Migration than by the 
Global Compact on Refugees, since many of them are not legally recognized as 
refugees. Even when a subset of actors such as UNHCR and local civil society 
groups try to identify, protect and assist them, asylum-seeking populations 
experience the insecurity, instability and uncertainty that come with living as 
non-citizens with irregular status.
The way that human mobility is understood and managed is shaped funda-
mentally by the formation of states, borders, and national imaginaries. The 
forming of postcolonial states in Southeast Asia resulted in varied relationships 
between people and state authorities. People have been included unevenly as 
citizens based on their ethnic identity and proximity to political and economic 
power. Postcolonial nation building has required ideological investment, 
with political leaders actively (re)constructing national identities. The quest 
to form coherent identities has not been bloodless  — internal strife, armed 
conflicts, and secessionist movements have marked struggles for power (Brown, 
1994; Snitwongse and Thompson, 2005; Oishi, 2016). However, nation-building 
1 Lecturer, Centre for Applied Human Rights, Department of Politics, University of York, 
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discourses have also succeeded in fuelling strong and instinctive nationalist 
pride, which normalizes and legitimizes the perspective that citizens should get 
preferential treatment over non-citizens.
In Southeast Asia, state borders bisect customary travel routes and territories. 
Modern immigration control regimes — consolidated in the twentieth century 
through decolonization — set the terms for “legal” movement across territorial 
borders. Despite efforts to regulate entry and exit, borders in Southeast Asia 
have been porous, weakened by prevalent corruption (Franck, 2018) and the 
inability of states to maintain comprehensive border controls. Well-developed 
smuggling and trafficking networks cut through Southeast Asian states, often 
involving chains of agents in different countries (Larsen 2010; Lindquist, 2010).
Historically the most renowned refugee movement in Southeast Asia was 
the Indochinese refugee crisis. Between 1975-1995, close to 2 million people left 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam overland and on boats, seeking refuge in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines amongst other countries in Asia (Frost, 
1980). States in Southeast Asia grappled with the complexities of protecting 
Indochinese refugees in various ways. The international community developed 
multilateral agreements to find durable solutions, enacting the Comprehensive 
Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA) in 1989 (Robinson, 1998). In this 
Plan, states in Southeast Asia agreed to hold refugees temporarily until they 
were resettled or repatriated home, voluntarily or not. A legacy of this inter-
national response is that states in Southeast Asia presume that refugees are a 
temporary “international (or UNHCR) problem” that is “solved” through reset-
tlement or repatriation — not local integration.2
At present, UNHCR projects the presence of 1,102,441 refugees and 55,658 
asylum seekers in Southeast Asia in 2019 (UNHCR, 2019a).3 Most of the people 
seeking asylum in Southeast Asia originate from Myanmar. Since August 2017, 
over 723,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2019b), adding to 
the 276,200 refugees from Myanmar already there at the end of 2016 (Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2017). One of the key 
challenges of refugee protection in Southeast Asia is the reluctance of states 
to legally recognize the status of refugees and to enable their enjoyment of 
rights. Only three states — Cambodia, the Philippines, and Timor Leste — are 
state parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol. Importantly, countries hosting the largest numbers of refugees – 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia – are not.4 The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has not committed to any forms of regional protection for 
people displaced across borders.
2 See for example, perspectives of Malaysian government officials as reported in the 
report by Equal Rights Trust and the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (2014).
3 It projects a further 1,135,808 stateless persons, 18,050 returned refugees, 332,483 
returned internally displaced persons, 515,943 internally displaced persons, and 80,120 
“others of concern”. For UNHCR, Southeast Asia includes Bangladesh.
4 While President Joko Widodo passed the landmark Presidential Decree 125 of 2016 
Concerning the Handling of Foreign Refugees thus defining and recognizing the status of 
refugees, this decree only recognizes only two durable solutions for refugees — resettle-
ment or repatriation — not integration, even on a temporary basis.
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The case of Malaysia is of interest to scholars and practitioners for several 
reasons. First, it hosts refugees in protracted situations5 in urban and rural 
areas  — they are not camp-based. Refugees mingle and live with citizens 
and other non-citizens; they are not kept geographically separate. Secondly, 
Malaysia is a key destination in the region for regular and irregular migration. 
It simultaneously creates legal channels for temporary labour migration while 
taking a hostile and punitive approach to irregular migration. Malaysia’s immi-
gration control mechanisms are a significant cause of the dangers and risks that 
refugees experience. Thirdly, Malaysia is a classic example of how UNHCR must 
advocate for refugee protection within the complexities of migration. Key to the 
protection of refugees is the recognition that they are a specific type of non-cit-
izen in legitimate need of international protection. UNHCR actively constructs 
refugees as being different from other “types” of non-citizens, a category that is 
conceptually and practically kept limited so that “others” — “non-refugees” — 
are unable to access the rights associated with this identification and so that 
refugees are perceived as a “much smaller’ and therefore “less threatening” 
group of people, requiring fewer resources to protect.
Drawing upon interactions with UNHCR officials, refugees, and civil society 
actors in Malaysia over the past fifteen years or so as a civil society refugee 
rights advocate and as a researcher6 — I examine how UNHCR, along with local 
civil society actors, create and expand “protection space” for people who seek 
asylum through the construction and reification of this category. This article adds 
to a gap in international relations literature about how international organisa-
tions such as UNHCR interact, act, and advocate for refugees at the domestic 
level. It argues that UNHCR may take on properties of a “surrogate state” 
(Slaughter and Crisp, 2009; Kagan, 2012; Miller, 2018) but it does so without 
sovereignty, operating with ambiguous authority. This ambiguity arises from the 
lack of clarity over its role and powers as an international organization operating 
in the territory of a state. This ambiguity has resulted in UNHCR gaining ground 
in refugee protection, but also causes confusion amongst state authorities  — 
and UNHCR officials  — about the legitimacy and limits of their authority. The 
need to cooperate with Malaysian authorities for specific cases of refugees also 
means that UNHCR cannot be as openly critical as it might want to be.
Troublingly, this approach — of identification, separation and the “rescue” of 
refugees from arrest, detention, and deportation — embeds UNHCR in domestic 
immigration control regimes. Refugees are only protected through UNHCR’s 
continuous intervention and their practices thus become grafted into state immi-
gration control practices, without an exit strategy. Critically, this approach also 
focuses on creating exceptions for a small number of people. A broader, more 
5 UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as a situation where “a refugee popula-
tion of 25,000 persons or more has been living in exile for five years or longer in a deve-
loping country” (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2004: 5).
6 I volunteered for the National Human Rights Society of Malaysia (HAKAM) from 
2002-2008, and was one of the founders of the Migration Working Group of Malaysia. 
I completed a doctoral dissertation at the National University of Singapore examining 
immigration control practices in Malaysia in 2012. I am a co-investigator of an inter-
national research project entitled “The law of asylum in the Middle East and Asia: 
Developing legal engagement at the frontiers of the international refugee regime”, led by 
Martin Jones and funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (2016-2019).
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inclusive approach is required to address the precarity of mobile subjects in 
Southeast Asia — one that recognizes their rights and their need for protection 
regardless of the circumstances of their movement.
The Violence of Categories
Scholars on migration have pointed out that the terms used to describe 
people who cross borders — such as “refugee” and “migrant” — are insufficient 
in capturing the complexities of their experiences (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; 
Karatani, 2005; Zetter, 2015). Such terms are often used to identify and separate 
different “types” of people who move, but these terms rely on simplified under-
standings of migration journeys. State authorities tend to assume that people 
choose when and how they move, begin a unidirectional journey from one place 
to another, and enter a country of destination with a clear motive.
Immigration control regimes operate on this logic. State authorities classify 
people who move based on why they enter a country and from where, assigning 
rights accordingly. However, people who move across borders can often fit in 
more than one immigration category (for example, a refugee could simultane-
ously be an international student and the foreign spouse of a citizen), and can 
change between categories relatively easily (Koser and Martin, 2011; Collyer and 
de Haas, 2012). While these categories appear self-evident and “timeless”, they 
are social and political constructions with specific histories (Zetter, 2007; Long, 
2013). Decision-making authorities can be stricter or more lenient in the classi-
fication of people into these categories, and the meaning of these categories 
change over time.
Similarly, scholars have been critical of the commonly expressed distinction 
between “forced” and “voluntary” migration, noting that people who move 
make choices on their journeys — choices that are constrained to a greater or 
lesser degree (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014; Richmond, 1994; Van Hear, 
1998). There are also involuntary aspects of movement in so-called “voluntary 
migration”, which some scholars suggest should be analysed as “forced 
economic migration” (Withers and Piper, 2018). Moreover, voluntariness in a 
decision to leave a place depends on the availability of “acceptable alterna-
tives” (Erdal and Oeppen, 2018). Scholars have also highlighted problems with 
concepts such as “transit migration”, which presumes that migration begins in 
one place and ends in another, when such journeys can be erratic, interrupted, 
and unpredictable (Collyer, 2007; Collyer and de Haas, 2012; Crawley et al., 2016; 
Sampson et al., 2016). Those who move across borders may not know where to 
go, may be forced to find alternative destinations, and may spent interminably 
long periods in places they thought to be temporary (Missbach, 2014; Moutnz, 
2011).
In the 1990s, scholars and practitioners working on forced displacement 
engaged considerably on the topic of “mixed migration”. This body of work arose 
of out the recognition that refugee movements were often “mixed” with other 
types of movements, that people who moved can have a “mix” of motivations 
that could change over time, and that it was therefore difficult to identify refugees 
(Van Hear et al., 2009). From this viewpoint, migration movements complicated 
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the protection of refugees, as states tended to perceive them as migrants 
(with irregular status) rather than people in need of asylum. The worry by state 
officials was that those who sought asylum were “really” “economic migrants” 
abusing asylum systems. The task at hand was therefore to identify, classify, and 
“separate out” a smaller sub-set of people from larger movements — that is, to 
“protect refugees within broader migration movements” (Executive Committee 
of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2002: 10). This approach reinforces the 
salience and importance of distinguishing between “refugees” and “migrants”. 
However, some scholars are critical of this approach to “mixed migration”, 
pointing out that people migrate with different degrees of volition and for 
diverse reasons, and that “migrants” should not be considered “less deserving” 
of protection when they need it (Erdal and Oeppen 2018; Bakewell, 2011).
“Mixed movements” continue to be a cause for concern for policymakers 
and practitioners. In Europe’s “migration crisis” (or “refugee crisis”) from 2015 
onwards, political and popular discourse focused on whether the people who 
moved “deserved” a place in Europe based on their background, countries 
of origin, and reasons for movement (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). Again, 
attention was placed on whether they were (genuine) refugees to which 
European states had legal obligations to grant asylum or (merely) “migrants” 
who should be deterred (Goodman, Sirriyeh and McMahon, 2017). Scholars 
have referred to this as “categorical fetishism” (Apostolova, 2015; Crawley and 
Sleparis 2018), that is “treat(ing) the categories “refugee’ and “migrant’ as if 
they simply exist, out there, as empty vessels into which people can be placed 
in some neutral ordering process like a small child putting bricks into a series of 
coloured buckets” (Crawley and Sleparis, 2018: 49).
Indeed, categories and the categorization of people as refugees has been 
the cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime. States and 
UNHCR have invested significant effort in building refugee status determination 
processes (RSD) to determine if a person is a refugee under international and 
domestic law. In countries that do not have domestic systems for this, UNHCR 
conducts RSD. Over time, UNHCR’s RSD caseload worldwide has grown signifi-
cantly, even exceeding those of states. However, this task is difficult, time-con-
suming, and resource-intensive. Studies show that states and UNHCR struggle 
to make RSD decisions in a timely, accurate, and consistent manner (Kagan, 
2006; Simeon, 2010 and 2017). UNHCR has recognized that it faces a “crisis” in 
RSD — it is unable to manage its overwhelming caseloads around the world and 
to meet the protection needs of people of its concern.
The Changing Role of UNHCR 
in Protracted Refugee Situations
The role of UNHCR in relation to forced displacement has evolved signifi-
cantly over time (Betts et al., 2008). The international refugee protection regime 
is based on the principle of burden  — or responsibility-sharing  — that states 
need to work together to address forced displacement. UNHCR supervises state 
practice in relation to international obligations towards asylum seekers and 
refugees. However, as Türk, the Assistant High Commissioner for Protection 
(and previous Representative of the High Commissioner to Malaysia from 2004-
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2008) observes, UNHCR plays an unusual role for a UN agency, “interceding 
directly on behalf of distinct individuals and groups of people” (Türk, 2010: 3). 
As Türk points out, there are contexts in which UNHCR plays a “de facto state 
substitution role” (p. 11), with “strong operational involvement” (p. 15). In such 
contexts, UNHCR gets directly involved in the daily lives of refugees, rather than 
just engaging in general policy and legal advocacy towards governments.
Reflecting on UNHCR’s role in protracted refugee situations, Slaughter and 
Crisp (2009) put forward the idea that in some contexts, UNHCR effectively 
becomes a “surrogate state” to refugees, “complete with its own territory 
(refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, health care, 
water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community participation, gender 
equality)” (p.  8). Slaughter and Crisp observes that this creates serious 
dilemmas for UNHCR, for while this approach enables them to protect refugees 
it also absolves host states of their responsibilities.
Examining UNHCR’s interventions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, Miller 
argues that “[international organisations] that take on more surrogate state 
properties tend to have less influence on the states in which they work” (2018: 
6). According to Miller, this occurs because of the marginalization of the state 
from refugee protection operations and responsibility shifting. Miller argues that 
marginalized states are incentivized to maintain the status quo, and benefit from 
letting UNHCR assume the costs and work of protecting and caring for refugees. 
Miller argues that in contexts when UNHCR plays a stronger surrogate state role, 
UNHCR can find it difficult to influence states. As states abdicate their respon-
sibilities, UNHCR steps in to fill the void but also takes the blame for whatever 
goes wrong. States become disinterested in refugee affairs, and UNHCR is 
forced to hold back its criticism to maintain access to refugees.
A logical solution to the problem of responsibility shifting is therefore to 
refocus attention on state responsibility. However, as Kagan (2012) points out, 
this is not a viable option in many countries. As he observes, “Even if fully 
committed in principle to state responsibility, UNHCR is often trapped into 
accepting quasi-government functions indefinitely, fearful that if it pulls back, 
refugees would simply be abandoned because host governments would be 
unwilling to step in” (p. 317). Focusing on refugee protection in Arab countries 
in the Middle East, Kagan then argues in favour of UNHCR’s role as a “surrogate 
state”, highlighting that this offers symbolic and material benefits to govern-
ments. He argues that the state-to-UN “responsibility shift” can be used strate-
gically, in a limited way, with clear lines of accountability and realistic expecta-
tions.
However, Kagan’s analysis rests on states “ignoring” refugees, or protecting 
their negative liberties by “doing nothing” while UNHCR takes on the tasks of 
registration and the provision of services. In some cases, as in Malaysia, the 
state actively pursues and punished migrants with irregular status, and UNHCR 
must intervene to protect refugees from such state actions. Kagan’s analysis 
also presumes that UNHCR has the resources, infrastructure and the goodwill 
of host states for such “shared responsibility”, and that UNHCR can manage the 
functions and services of a state efficiently and effectively. As this article shows, 
despite UNHCR’s significant efforts, its protective reach is limited and it remains 
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chronically under-resourced. Furthermore, UNHCR’s adoption of the surrogate 
state role in Malaysia emerged over time, as its own response to unfolding 
events and the protection needs of refugees — it was not by the invitation of the 
Malaysian state, and the lines of accountability, responsibility and authority for 
refugees are continuously blurred and renegotiated.
In contrast to UNHCR, there is no other international organisation that deals 
with other forms of migration in a similar way, leading to a significant gap in 
the protection of people on the move (Hollifield, 2000). While the International 
Organisation for Migration is perceived as a leading inter-governmental orga-
nization dealing with migration and became a “related organization of the UN” 
in 2016, it is explicitly “non-normative” (Guild and Grant, 2017). Significantly, it 
does not have the rights-based protection mandate that UNHCR does. As critics 
point out, IOM’s funding model also means that it often takes on projects funded 
by states that focus on border control and the implementation of state migration 
policies rather than the rights of people who move across borders (Brachet, 
2015). In contrast, while the International Labour Organisation has played a 
critical role in developing labour standards and rights for people on the move, 
its mandate and structure does not lend itself to a broad spectrum of migration 
management activities (Hughes and Haworth, 2013). Its field presence is also 
limited. As a result, there is a lacuna in the protection of people experiencing 
precarity as they move within and across borders.
Protecting Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Malaysia
At the end of December 20187, there were 163,860 asylum seekers and 
refugees registered with UNHCR, of whom 67% were men and 33% were women 
(UNHCR, 2019c). 86.5% originate from Myanmar — comprising 88,880 Rohingyas, 
26,180 Chins, 9,800 Myanmar Muslims, 4,000 Rakhines and Arakanese, and 
other ethnicities from Myanmar. 22,070 asylum seekers and refugees come 
from other countries, mainly from South Asia and the Middle East. In Peninsular 
Malaysia, most asylum seekers and refugees live in urban areas, with the 
highest concentrations in Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Penang. These groups 
live in two broad types of places — what civil society groups and UNHCR term 
“urban sites” or “urban areas” — typically run-down, low-cost flats and houses 
in inner-city neighbourhoods — and “jungle sites” — typically plantation, jungle, 
or construction areas (Nah, 2010). The former tends to be spaces of urban decay, 
while the latter tend to be frontiers of urban expansion — places where they can 
live relatively cheaply and find informal work.
According to Malaysian law, asylum seekers and refugees are not distin-
guished from migrants with irregular status, and are therefore at risk of arrest, 
detention and deportation. The Immigration Act 1959/1963 provides the police 
and immigration authorities with widespread powers to arrest anyone they 
suspect of committing an immigration offence. Entry into Malaysia without 
7 While I have highlighted the politics and complexities of using terms such as “refugee” 
and “migrant”, it is impossible to move away from using these terms. When using the 
term “refugee” in this paper, I refer not only to people who have gone through UNHCR’s 
RSD processes and have been formally recognized as refugees but include those who 
would like to seek asylum but have not been able to.
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authorization is punishable by a fine of up to RM10,000 and/or imprison-
ment of up to five years, and possible whipping of not more than six strokes 
(Section 6-3). Those who stay beyond the period of their permits are liable for the 
same level of fines and imprisonment (Section 15-1 to 4). Their lack of status in 
domestic law is the primary source of insecurity for asylum-seeking populations.
Malaysia was a country of first asylum for Indochinese refugees. Through 
negotiations with other states and through its participation in the CPA, Malaysia 
eventually hosted around 258,500 Vietnamese refugees in temporary, isolated, 
closed camps. By 1998, 249,132 had been resettled to third countries and 9,365 
returned to Vietnam (UNHCR Malaysia, 1998). The last Vietnamese refugee from 
this period in history departed Malaysia in August 2005 (Steenhuisen, 2005). 
Over the past few decades, Malaysia has also voluntarily and formally offered 
asylum to different groups of Muslim refugees, such as the Khmer Muslims 
from Cambodia and Muslim refugees from the Southern Philippines in the 
1970s (Robinson, 1998; Strauch, 1980); Bosnian Muslims fleeing the collapse of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Farley, 1994), and Acehnese refugees from Indonesia in 
the 2000s (Nah and Bunnell, 2005). In October 2015, Malaysia offered protection 
to around 3,000 refugees from Syria under a Temporary Relocation Programme 
for Syrian Migrants. In 2017, it launched a pilot work scheme for UNHCR-
registered Rohingyas, permitting around 300 of them to work in the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors.
In the 1990s, there were small movements of groups seeking asylum in 
Peninsular Malaysia — far less visible than the heavily publicized Indochinese 
refugees. UNHCR registered around 200-250 new arrivals a year who originated 
from different countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa (UNHCR Malaysia, 
1998). The relative invisibility of these “urban refugees” perpetuated a lack of 
proactive response from UNHCR and from Malaysian civil society groups. Aside 
from the Indochinese refugees (then sequestered in camps), the dominant myth 
until 2003 was that very few, if any, refugees existed in Malaysia.
Asylum-seeking and migrant populations are attracted to Malaysia for several 
reasons. Firstly, it is relatively easy to gain access into its territories. Robust 
networks of smugglers, often in collusion with Malaysian immigration border 
control officials, have constructed numerous routes over land and sea from 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Ananta and Arifin, 2004; Battistella and 
Asis, 2003; Spaan, Naerssen and Kohl, 2002). Malaysia is also a hub for interna-
tional air travel, with flights coming in from all over the world. It is relatively easy 
for most travelers to get a tourist visa to visit Malaysia. Asylum-seeking popu-
lations can enter Malaysia through several legal means — as migrant workers, 
tourists, and students — staying on beyond the terms of their visas, and then 
mounting asylum claims with UNHCR.
Secondly, Malaysia is a relatively affluent country with low unemployment. It 
is possible to get informal work, particularly in the construction, agriculture and 
service sectors — albeit with associated vulnerabilities to exploitation (Franck, 
2016; HEI, 2011). The availability of work is crucial for the avoidance of poverty, 
as asylum-seeking populations usually live in Malaysia for years. Thirdly, as 
numbers grow, refugees have been better able to receive social and material 
support from members of their own communities in Malaysia (McConnachie, 
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2018; Nah, 2014). Fourthly, refugees from Myanmar are not deported directly to 
Myanmar but to Thailand, which gives them a sense — false or not — that they 
would be “better protected” in Malaysia. Asylum seekers have also been drawn 
to Malaysia because it is perceived as a moderate Muslim nation and has had, 
historically, high rates of UNHCR-facilitated resettlement.
Distinguishing Refugees: 
UNHCR’s Evolving Practices
Malaysia has permitted UNHCR to maintain an office in Kuala Lumpur since 
1975, when it assisted the government in responding to the Indochinese refugee 
crisis. There is only one UNHCR office in Malaysia, located in the exclusive resi-
dential area of Bukit Petaling. All who seek asylum and international protection 
come to this office eventually — it is where they go to be registered with UNHCR; 
attend refugee status determination interviews; seek financial assistance; return 
when released from immigration detention depots; make appeals for help; 
mount collective protest to express grievances; and from where they depart for 
resettlement to other countries. As a result, Kuala Lumpur has become a unique 
node for populations seeking refuge in Malaysia — it is where they mingle, find 
work, pool resources, establish communities, and seek international protection 
(Hoffstaedter, 2014; Nah, 2014).
The scope of UNHCR’s work has changed over time. It maintained a relatively 
quiet operation from 1996 to 2001, receiving an average of 820 new applications 
for asylum each year (UNHCR, 2004). From 2002 onwards however, UNHCR 
received significantly larger numbers of new claims for asylum, primarily 
from nationals from Indonesia (mostly Acehnese) and Myanmar. In 2002, the 
Malaysian government amended the Immigration Act 1959/1963 to include 
whipping as a punishment for irregular entry. This, and the ensuing public 
“crackdown” on migrants with irregular status, prompted many non-citizens to 
seek asylum as a means for forestalling arrest, punishment and forced depor-
tation (Nah, 2011). In 2003, UNHCR in Malaysia registered a significant increase 
in new asylum claims, from 2,131 applications in the previous year to 18,626 
(UNHCR, 2005). Since then, Malaysia has been one of UNHCR’s busiest RSD 
operations in the world.
Practices of Identification
To protect asylum seekers and refugees as such, it is necessary to identify 
them. UNHCR performs this function through registration and RSD activities.8 
The ways it conducts these activities changes over time, in response to caseload 
pressures as well as understandings of which refugee groups should be given 
priority. At present, refugees from Myanmar are treated differently from refugees 
from other countries (further elaborated below). Typically, non-Myanmar asylum 
seekers approach UNHCR in their office, and their basic details are taken down. 
After potentially long periods of waiting in uncertainty, UNHCR calls them for 
8 In 2017, the Malaysian government launched a refugee monitoring and tracking system 
called Tracking Refugees Information Systems (TRIS) through which it would issue 
“MyRC” cards to refugees. However, the government has not clarified what rights card-
holders will have and only a small number have been registered to date.
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registration, issuing them with a paper document. The length of the waiting 
period depends on their nationality and vulnerability. They are then given dates 
for RSD interviews, which can be scheduled for several weeks or months ahead 
of time depending on caseloads. 
Some asylum seekers are given a decision after the first interview, while 
others attend several interviews before a decision is made. In many cases, the 
process of registration and status determination is protracted, lasting for years, 
much to the frustration of asylum seekers. Those who are rejected after the RSD 
interview can appeal the decision made. Those who are rejected again following 
their appeal can ask for their case to be re-opened based on their ability to 
provide new information to support their claim. Those recognised as refugees 
are issued a plastic, tamper-proof, biometric identity card with security features. 
The asylum seeker letters and the refugee identity cards are time-specific 
documents with expiry dates that need to be renewed periodically. The renewal 
of these identity documents allows UNHCR to maintain updated records of the 
populations under its purview.
Aside from Rohingyas, UNHCR considered refugees from Myanmar to be at 
the “end of their refugee cycle” and thus not as a high priority. UNHCR restricts 
registration to those identified as “vulnerable”  — either by themselves or by 
civil society partners through a Partner Referral Network process established 
by UNHCR  — and to those in detention. Although Rohingyas are considered 
as needing protection as refugees, access to registration is still limited to those 
identified as vulnerable and to those who are detained, due to the large numbers 
of Rohingyas in Malaysia.
Between 2004-2008, UNHCR maintained registration levels at around 47,000 
persons of concern. In 2009, it increased these numbers, which have now settled 
to around 140,000-170,000 persons of concern. Year upon year, thousands of 
asylum seekers and refugees remain unregistered despite their great desire 
to seek UNHCR assistance. Difficulties in getting registered and their status 
determined has been one of the most frequent complaints voiced by asylum 
seekers and refugees. UNHCR restricts registration for several reasons. One is 
a concern that high registration numbers will invite criticisms by the Malaysian 
government that UNHCR is not sufficiently rigorous in differentiating between 
irregular migrants and refugees. Another is that they do not have the resources 
to register, manage and care for large numbers of people. However, these 
restrictions have also resulted in negative outcomes, such as the failure of 
UNHCR to accurately identify and protect particularly vulnerable refugees such 
as unaccompanied minors and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in 
spite of their significant efforts to do so.
Practices of Intervention and Advocacy
Another very significant way in which UNHCR protects registered refugees 
is intervening when they are arrested, detained, and charged in court. Since the 
2005 crackdown on irregular immigrants, UNHCR has maintained a “hotline” 
through which it receives emergency calls for assistance. When responding to 
an arrest, UNHCR records as many details as possible, including the name of 
the arrested person, their location, the UNHCR reference number (as recorded 
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on their UNHCR documents or cards), and, when they are detained in immigra-
tion detention depots, their “body number”. UNHCR then contacts the relevant 
authority to request for their release and/or makes an appointment to see the 
person in detention. The Police usually release those who hold refugee identity 
cards after verifying their documents with UNHCR, if they were detained solely 
for committing an immigration offence. Such releases were more commonplace 
after UNHCR launched a new mobile app in 2016 (the UNHCR My Verify App) that 
enables law enforcement agents to check the authenticity of UNHCR cards held 
by refugees immediately.
Those that are not released by the Police are typically kept in police lock-ups 
and transferred to immigration detention depots within several days, while 
those that are arrested by Immigration are either kept in immigration holding 
facilities or taken directly to immigration detention depots. All non-citizens who 
are arrested can be legally subject to fourteen days of remand before they must 
be presented before a magistrate. Often, those under remand are not allowed to 
make any outside contact, which makes it difficult for them to seek assistance.
In 2005, in response to advocacy by UNHCR and civil society groups, the 
Attorney General’s Chambers agreed to waive prosecution for immigration 
offences for recognized refugees registered with UNHCR. However, if a refugee 
is charged with immigration offences and brought to court, UNHCR makes an 
application to the Attorney General’s Office for these charges to be dropped and 
arranges for a Malaysian lawyer to provide legal aid.9 UNHCR’s support of legal 
aid has produced significant results. Importantly, its legal interventions have 
helped to establish the precedent that refugees should be exempt from the 
punishment of whipping for immigration offences.
In the case of Tun Naing Oo vs Public Prosecutor [2009] 6 CLJ 490, the High 
Court reviewed a judgement by a sessions court judge of an asylum seeker 
from Burma charged and convicted under section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 
1959/63 and sentenced to 100 days of imprisonment and two strokes of the cane. 
In this case, the judge considered whether whipping was a sentence that was 
“manifestly excessive” and whether the applicant should be spared “on human-
itarian grounds” (p. 490). The judge stated:
“It is inhumane and serves no purpose to impose the sentence of whipping upon an 
asylum-seeker or refugee. If asylum seekers or refugees: (a) have not committed acts 
of violence or brutality; (b) are not habitual offenders; or (c) have not threatened public 
order, they should not be punished with whipping.” (p. 491)
The judge observed that asylum seekers and refugees were subject to 
domestic laws including the Immigration Act 1959/63 and were therefore liable 
for immigration offences. However, the judge also stated that sentencing must 
be “appropriate” to their circumstances rather than excessive. Using this legal 
precedent, Malaysian lawyers have succeeded in ensuring that other refugees 
are not whipped.
9 However, UNHCR does not intervene if the individual is charged with criminal offences.
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UNHCR also visits asylum seekers and refugees in prisons and immigration 
detention depots across the Peninsula, monitoring conditions of detention. 
UNHCR writes to the Immigration Department to request for the release of 
individual detainees and at different points in time, immigration officials have 
permitted the release of refugees on different grounds. At present, Rohingyas 
(and sporadically, other groups) are released, but other Myanmar nationals are 
almost never released. UNHCR’s interventions for asylum seekers and refugees 
in detention are significant. In 2018, over a five-month period, UNHCR registered 
(and conducted RSD) for 969 persons, and secured the release of 1,858 persons 
of whom sixty eight were children (UNHCR, 2019d).
However, not all asylum seekers and refugees are able to obtain comprehen-
sive assistance from UNHCR, and as such, have faced the full brunt of arrest, 
punishment for immigration offences, indefinite detention and forced depor-
tation (sometimes leading to refoulement). This occurs for several reasons. As 
stated, some are unable to call UNHCR when they are arrested or to keep UNHCR 
updated as to their whereabouts when they are transferred from one detention 
facility to another. Secondly, law enforcement officers sometimes give UNHCR 
misleading information, stating that the person they enquire after is not present 
in their detention facility. This makes it difficult for UNHCR to establish contact 
with persons of concern in detention. Thirdly, immigration officers exercise 
discretion in relation to the release of detainees. An officer can reject or delay 
decisions on applications by UNHCR for the release of individuals depending 
on his/her mood and foibles. As mentioned above, they also favour the release 
of some nationalities — such as Rohingyas — over others. Fourthly, it is more 
difficult for UNHCR to intervene on behalf of asylum seekers and refugees who 
were not registered with them at the time of their arrest.
The inability of refugees to integrate locally or to return home makes reset-
tlement to a third country the only viable “durable solution”. Historically, UNHCR 
has been able to negotiate many resettlement places for refugees, making 
Malaysia a key node in Asia for the dispersal of refugees to developed countries. 
From facilitating the resettlement of less than 100 people in 2002 (UNHCR, 2002), 
it facilitated 12,547 in 2015 (UNHCR, 2019e). However, annual numbers have 
dropped significantly since, down to 2,407 in 2018 (UNHCR, 2019e).
Perspectives of UNHCR from those who Seek Refuge
While UNHCR faces political and economic challenges in fulfilling its 
mandate, it still wields considerable power over the lives of people who seek 
protection from persecution and conflict (Hyndman, 2000; Moulin and Nyers, 
2007) — UNHCR shapes their daily routines, their relationships, their families, 
and their imagination of their futures. Asylum seekers and refugees who come 
to Malaysia have some pre-conceptions of what to expect when they arrive, 
formed based on the stories told by their friends and family, and sometimes, 
the smugglers who try to attract their business. However, much more intense 
“learning” occurs as they deal with the practicalities of living and surviving 
in Malaysia (McConnachie, 2018). Many of the opinions they hold are shaped 
through formal interactions with community-based organisations, Malaysian 
NGOs, and UNHCR, as well as through informal interactions with other refugees.
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New arrivals often find it difficult to trust authority figures. Some feel afraid 
of UNHCR personnel, seeing the UN system as a form of bureaucratic control 
that liaises uncomfortably closely with the government of Malaysia and their 
own governments. They are afraid that their biographical information and their 
narratives of resistance to state repression collected by UNHCR during RSD 
interviews will be shared with their own governments without their knowledge. 
They distrust bureaucracy. Some refugees, especially those who have been 
arrested in their countries of origin, are instinctively afraid of UNHCR security 
guards — their uniforms and manners remind them of the military and police at 
home who mistreated them and/or their families and friends. The reassurance of 
civil society groups and fellow community members as well as the witnessing 
of practical assistance and outcomes of asylum claims helps to counter this 
distrust, but in some cases, it is never fully overcome. Some refugees remain 
ambivalent about UNHCR, seeing it as a quasi-government entity that may 
or may not be trustworthy, that may or may not be truly committed to their 
personal protection, and which wields significant power over their lives.
Those who have been arrested and have had their deportation halted by 
UNHCR have spent indefinite periods in detention. Sometimes, they have done 
so after serving prisons sentences and being whipped for immigration offences. 
Detention conditions vary, but in many immigration detention depots, detainees 
suffer from overcrowding, poor sanitation, insufficient food, water, clothing and 
bedding, as well as poor access to health services and exposure to violence from 
fellow detainees and guards (Nah, 2015). Afraid of deportation, many have opted 
to live for long periods in these stark circumstances, sometimes for years. Some, 
unable to bear the uncertainty of indefinite detention, have opted for “voluntary 
deportation”. To mitigate the risks involved, some detainees from Myanmar have 
paid bribes to get deported to the Thai-Malaysia border at specific times and 
into the hands of specific smugglers. They have preferred to risk the dangers 
faced at border zones with the possibility of freedom afterward than to face the 
bleakness of continued indefinite detention. However, opting for deportation has 
been risky. Refugees have been handed over to traffickers at the Thai-Malaysia 
border, who have held them for ransom and extorted them for exorbitant 
payments (Aziz, 2014). The price of these transactions has increased over the 
years, depending on the location of deportation and smuggler involved. Those 
who failed to pay have been sold — men to fishing boats as forced labourers, 
and women to brothels and other private businesses.
The Role of Civil Society Actors: 
Malaysian Civil Society Groups and 
Refugee Community-based Organisations
Civil society actors in Malaysia — non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
faith-based groups, lawyers, and volunteers  — have played a critical role in 
providing services to asylum-seeking populations and providing avenues for 
advocacy. They have called upon the Malaysian government repeatedly to 
recognize the specific circumstances of asylum seekers and refugees and to 
protect their rights, for example in submissions to the Human Rights Council’s 
University Periodic Review Process and the Committee on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Some NGOs publish reports that 
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highlight specific challenges faced by refugee communities, such as difficulties 
of access to healthcare and the high incidence of forced labour and exploitation 
(HEI, 2010 and 2011). The Bar Council of Malaysia often hold seminars, roundta-
bles and conferences to build more awareness about the situation of asylum-
seeking populations.
Civil society actors usually coordinate their actions with UNHCR. However, 
relations with UNHCR can be tricky to navigate. UNHCR’s opinion of their work 
can be influential; some funders make it an explicit requirement that their 
grantees collaborate with UNHCR. Civil society groups can have very strong 
differences of opinion with UNHCR officers on its policies and practices. As a 
Malaysian lawyer providing legal aid to refugees observed:
“We never operate under the assumption that UNHCR is doing everything right and 
I don’t think they do, as well [...] They really try to balance a lot of things: not being shut 
down — which they have been threatened with before — but also dealing with a very 
hostile government [and] dealing with NGOs that are pushing them.”10
A small but growing number of Malaysian lawyers have been more involved 
in legal aid to refugees. In some cases, they have aided refugees in appealing 
rejections in UNHCR’s RSD process. A lawyer involved in the case of a female 
survivor of trafficking who had been rejected twice stated:
“They basically wanted legal representation because she was very traumatized… 
and she revealed it, like little bits and bobs here and there that… her husband had 
basically trafficked her and this… really horrible trafficking syndicate led to her arriving 
in Malaysia. This was really important information that UNHCR didn’t have before. So, 
with that, we just kind of went all in and provided representation and she actually got 
accepted... that was a really important case to know the value of legal representation.”11
A controversial issue at time of writing is UNHCR’s decision that Chin 
refugees no longer need protection based on their analysis that the situation 
in Chin state in Myanmar is now stable and secure. In India and Malaysia, Chin 
refugees have been informed that their refugee status will end on 31 December 
2019; they have been strongly encouraged to return voluntarily. Civil society 
groups dispute UNHCR’s analysis, noting that the situation in Chin state has 
not been fully stabilized despite some progress in recent years. In June 2018, 
hundreds of Chin refugees demonstrated at the UNHCR office in Malaysia, 
protesting this decision. Chin refugee groups remain unconvinced that it is safe 
to return and are worried that their loss of refugee status would result in greater 
precarity. The cessation of the status of Chin refugees highlights the significance 
of distinguishing refugees from migrants and how such acts are often contested, 
even amongst actors motivated to protect refugees.
It is important to note that asylum-seeking populations themselves have 
developed strategies to reduce their precarity. They have developed localized, 
contingent, negotiated arrangements with law enforcement officers that enable 
10 Interview with a Malaysian lawyer for the Law of Asylum project, conducted in Kuala 
Lumpur on 25 November 2017.
11 Interview with a Malaysian lawyer for the Law of Asylum project, conducted in Kuala 
Lumpur on 30 November 2017.
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them to live with a greater security. They have been able to plead with police 
officers for the release of their friends or family members  — often facilitated 
with the payment of a bribe. They have been able to visit friends and family 
in some detention centres, and to arrange for food and goods to be given to, 
or bought for, detainees. Some asylum-seeking groups have organized them-
selves into community-based organisations (CBOs), usually formed based on 
ethnic and/or territorial identity in their country of origin (McConnachie, 2018; 
Nah, 2014). Through these organisations, refugees run programmes that help 
their members’ access healthcare, education, and emergency donations (such 
as food and clothing). They often work in collaboration with Malaysian civil 
society actors. These self-help groups have also organised collective action — 
expressing political discontent outside of the embassies of their own countries, 
or, as mentioned above, protesting their treatment outside the gates of UNHCR.
A notable protection strategy that refugee CBOs have adopted are their own 
registration systems. The community cards they issue to their members have 
been given some recognition by the police, who sometimes accept the cards as 
a basis for identifying an individual as an asylum seeker. In the past, community 
registration cards were also accepted by UNHCR as a way of “pre-screening” 
individuals as being genuine asylum seekers. Community registration has also 
been given recognition by the judiciary. In the case of Tun Naing Oo vv PP, 
mentioned above, the High Court judge advised asylum seekers and refugees 
to show their registration with their community as proof of their status to avoid 
a sentence of whipping. These are daily practices enacted by asylum-seeking 
groups to signify themselves as being different from other people on the move.
UNHCR’s Ambiguous Authority
UNHCR’s efforts at identifying, protecting and assisting asylum-seeking 
populations have resulted in the emergence of an alternative regime of regula-
tion aimed at minimizing the negative impacts of Malaysia’s immigration control 
mechanisms on them. Asylum-seeking populations place great importance on 
UNHCR registration and recognition of status; it is their only hope of avoiding 
arrest, detention, whipping and refoulement as well as of getting resettled. 
However, these interventions require the attentiveness of UNHCR staff; it places 
great pressure on them to respond to each case reported to them. There have 
been instances where UNHCR officers have not intervened on time, or at all; 
there are times when their interventions have been unsuccessful.
The creation of “protection space” for refugees involves political sense-
making in situations of uncertainty, in the face of occasional hostility from 
government officials. UNHCR officers often find themselves make strategic 
and operational decisions without being able to predict the outcomes of these 
decisions. In the eyes of civil society groups, they sometimes do not go far 
enough to protect the rights of refugees, while in the eyes of government author-
ities they sometimes overstep their mandate (for example, by protecting non-cit-
izens who are not “really” refugees) or fail to fulfill their role (for example, by not 
resettling refugees as quickly as they “should”). There are also key weaknesses 
in adopting the “protection space” approach. As Jones (2014: 257) observes crit-
ically, this non-binding, non-legal approach:
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“Privileges international interests, fora, and UNHCR as the negotiator; devalues the 
normative strength of obligations towards refugees; and, allows the underlying responsi-
bility for the provision of refugee protection to drift from the state to UNHCR.”
The impact of UNHCR field presences are also directly affected by funding. 
Since 2014, UNHCR’s average annual expenditure in Malaysia has been around 
40-47% of its average annual budget (UNHCR, 2019f). UNHCR has become 
embedded in intervening and “rescuing” refugees from Malaysia’s punitive 
immigration control regime, a role for which there seems no end. This state 
of affairs is unlikely to change unless Malaysia introduces a formal legal and 
administrative framework for the protection of asylum-seeking populations. To 
date, there are no signs that it intends to do so, despite repeated calls for this 
to happen from Malaysian civil society groups, UNHCR, and the international 
diplomatic community.
To perform its role of protection, UNHCR “mimics” the approach of state 
authorities in regulating individuals  — it documents individual identity and 
issues identity cards and letters. It regulates this population, requiring individ-
uals to report themselves periodically to get their time-limited identity cards 
renewed. However, UNHCR’s reach is not comprehensive. There are thousands 
of asylum seekers and refugees who remain unregistered. A strategic question 
that confronts every UNHCR operation at the country level — and from which 
UNHCR in Malaysia is not exempt  — is how far they are able to act for the 
protection of asylum-seeking populations before they “cross the line”. UNHCR 
is concerned about pushing too much, and thus reducing their “protection 
space”  — the space they are given to intercede for and provide services to 
populations in need. UNHCR officials express concern about being declared 
persona non-grata, being kicked out of the country, and having their country 
operations shut down. As UNHCR often operates with ambiguity, especially 
when they respond to unfolding crises and when they try out new initiatives, 
their fear leads them to be conservative in the interpretation of their mandate 
and cautious in their advocacy and actions. Two other beliefs shape the nature, 
quality and boldness of UNHCR’s advocacy and actions for refugees  — first, 
the idea that such protection activities are not really their responsibility but the 
responsibility of host states (perhaps the psychological rejection by UNHCR 
officials of their role as “surrogate state” officials), and relatedly, that whatever 
they manage to do is better than nothing at all.
UNHCR’s interventions demonstrate the interest of the international 
community in protecting a certain type of vulnerable non-citizen. UNHCR 
invokes a global governance regime for their protection, using whatever 
resources it can to compel Malaysia to recognise the special circumstances of 
asylum seekers and refugees. Cautious of its international image, Malaysia has 
tempered its exercise of sovereign power, allowing UNHCR to influence the 
behaviour of its law enforcement authorities. In documenting individual identity, 
UNHCR provides state authorities with a system for their individual regulation. 
UNHCR takes on properties of a “surrogate state”, but without sovereignty and 
with ambiguous authority.
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Conclusion
Despite the significant efforts at protection mentioned above, life is difficult 
for most, if not all, asylum-seeking populations in Malaysia. A large proportion 
suffers from extraordinarily high levels of stress, anxiety, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and depression (HEI, 2010 and 2011). Some struggle with traumas from 
the past, particularly if they were raped or tortured. Many live in, or very close 
to, poverty. Nevertheless, exile in Malaysia is also a time for re-constituting 
meaning, involvement, and achievement. Community leaders and workers have 
felt a deep sense of fulfilment when assisting their “own people” (McConnachie, 
2018; Nah, 2014). Refugees have become more connected to their own extended 
kin and to ethnic groups as they try to lead “normal” lives in Malaysia, speaking 
familiar dialects, getting married, raising children, celebrating cultural identity, 
and enjoying their own food (Aziz, 2014; Hoffstaedter, 2014). They have also 
formed unexpected friendships with members of other ethnic groups from their 
country of origin. However, they are also vulnerable to high levels of violence 
and exploitation.
This article advances the argument that UNHCR’s approximation of a 
“surrogate state” in complex migration contexts models to states the daily 
practices needed to protect asylum seekers and refugees. However, UNHCR’s 
presence and interventions at the domestic level are contingent on the coopera-
tion and goodwill of states and their efforts are complicated by their ambiguous 
authority. Their focus on persons of their concern can result in the privileging of 
refugees over other mobile subjects, the exclusion of those “de-categorised” as 
refugees, and the neglect of many other non-citizens living with precarity. More 
comprehensive, integrated, rights-based measures are needed to attend to the 
specific circumstances of precarious mobile subjects in Southeast Asia to ensure 
that their rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled.
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The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”: 
UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the Complexities 
of Migration in Southeast Asia
In complex migration contexts, protection actors have had to invest tremendous 
effort into signifying “refugees” as a legitimate type of non-citizen deserving 
of international protection. This article examines how the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reinforces the distinction between 
“refugees” and “migrants” through resource-intensive practices of identifica-
tion, intervention, and advocacy in Malaysia, which have resulted in the partial, 
impermanent protection of some refugees. In such situations, UNHCR takes on 
properties of a “surrogate state” but does so without sovereignty, negotiating 
the protection of refugees in urban and rural areas with ambiguous authority. In 
recent years, Rohingyas have become the archetypal refugee in Southeast Asia. 
Troublingly, UNHCR has argued that other refugees from Myanmar in protracted 
situations are no longer in need of international protection. Contemporary 
constructions of “refugees” fail to address the complexities of migration but 
have become a necessary protection measure. Alternative ways are needed to 
address the precarity of diverse mobile subjects in Southeast Asia.
L’autorité ambiguë d’un État subrogé : 
la négociation de l’asile par le HCR face à la 
complexité des migrations en Asie du Sud-Est
Dans des contextes migratoires complexes, les acteurs soucieux de la protection 
des migrants ont dû déployer des efforts considérables pour que les « réfugiés » 
soient reconnus comme des non-citoyens ayant besoin d’une protection interna-
tionale. Cet article examine comment le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies 
pour les réfugiés (HCR) renforce la distinction entre « réfugiés » et « migrants » 
par le biais de pratiques d’identification, d’intervention et de plaidoyer qui 
nécessitent des ressources considérables en Malaisie et qui ont abouti à la 
protection partielle et non permanente de certains réfugiés. Dans de telles situa-
tions, le HCR se pose comme un « État de substitution », mais sans souveraineté, 
négociant la protection des réfugiés dans les zones urbaines et rurales avec une 
autorité ambiguë. Ces dernières années, les Rohingyas sont devenus l’arché-
type des réfugiés en Asie du Sud-Est. Il est inquiétant de constater que le HCR 
a fait valoir que d’autres réfugiés du Myanmar se trouvant dans des situations 
prolongées n’ont plus besoin d’une protection internationale. Les constructions 
contemporaines de «  réfugiés  » ne tiennent pas compte de la complexité de 
la migration, mais sont devenues une mesure de protection nécessaire. Il faut 
trouver d’autres moyens de reconnaître et de traiter la précarité des diverses 
catégories de personnes mobiles vivant dans la région de l’Asie du Sud-Est.
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La ambigua autoridad de un Estado de sustitución: 
la negociación del asilo por parte de la ACNUR frente 
a la complejidad de las migraciones en el sudeste asiático
En contextos complejos de migración, los actores de la protección han tenido 
que invertir un esfuerzo tremendo en significar a los «refugiados» como un tipo 
legítimo de no-ciudadanos que merecen protección internacional. Este artículo 
examina cómo el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados 
(ACNUR) refuerza la distinción entre «refugiados» y «migrantes» a través de 
prácticas de identificación, intervención y defensa en Malasia que requieren 
muchos recursos y que han dado lugar a la protección parcial e impermanente 
de algunos refugiados. En tales situaciones, el ACNUR asume las propiedades 
de un «Estado sustituto», pero lo hace sin soberanía, negociando la protección 
de los refugiados en las zonas urbanas y rurales con una autoridad ambigua. En 
los últimos años, los rohingyas se han convertido en los refugiados arquetípicos 
del sudeste asiático. Es preocupante que el ACNUR haya argumentado que 
otros refugiados de Myanmar que se encuentran en situaciones prolongadas ya 
no necesitan protección internacional. Las construcciones contemporáneas de 
«refugiados» no abordan las complejidades de la migración, pero se han conver-
tido en una medida de protección necesaria. Se necesitan formas alternativas 
para abordar la precariedad de diversos temas móviles en el sudeste asiático.
